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Abstract
Risk sharing arrangements diminish individuals’ vulnerability to probabilistic events that
negatively affect their financial situation. This is because risk sharing implies redistribution,
as lucky individuals support the unlucky ones. We hypothesize that responsibility for risky
choices decreases individuals’ willingness to share risk by dampening redistribution motives,
and investigate this conjecture with a laboratory experiment. Responsibility is created by
allowing participants to choose between two different risky lotteries before they decide how
much risk they share with a randomly matched partner. Risk sharing is then compared to a
treatment where risk exposure is randomly assigned. We find that average risk sharing does
not depend on whether individuals can control their risk exposure. However, we observe
that when individuals are responsible for their risk exposure, risk sharing decisions are
systematically conditioned on the risk exposure of the sharing partner, whereas this is not
the case when risk exposure is random.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental premise for the support of safety nets, such as social security systems and
private insurance, is that individuals are willing to share risk with others, thereby accepting the
resulting redistribution of income. The decision to share risk may be backed by both insurance
and redistribution motives. The first has a selfish nature, as it allows risk averse individuals
to reduce their risk exposure. The second is driven by a preference for equality, as whenever
risk is shared those who are lucky support the more unlucky individuals in society. The more
risk is shared the more income inequalities are reduced ex-post. For a long time, the idea of
tailoring insurance rates to risk types has been debated in public.1 For example, proposals to
charge higher health insurance premiums to smokers and obese people have been advanced, with
the motivation that a high proportion of health care costs can be directly attributed to patients’
bad habits (see Cawley and Ruhm, 2011 and Thomson Reuters, 2011). In light of this evidence,
we hypothesize that in the absence of responsibility attributions for risk exposure, redistribution
motives are stronger and the willingness to share risk higher, as compared to when individuals
can influence the risk they face. We test this conjecture using a controlled laboratory experiment,
focusing on endogenous and exogenous differences in risk exposure. Our set-up allows studying
how the support for risk sharing depends on individuals’ risk preferences, their own risk exposure,
and their sharing partner’s risk exposure.
Empirical research on risk sharing has identified a number of factors that affect individuals’
propensity to share risk, e.g. group size (Chaudhuri et al., 2010), group selection and commitment
(Barr and Genicot, 2008), risk preferences and social networks (Attanasio et al., 2012), one’s own
and others’ exogenous risk profiles (Tausch et al., 2014) and reciprocity in repeated interactions
(Charness and Genicot, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate how risk sharing depends on whether individuals perceive themselves and others to
be responsible for the extent to which they are exposed to risk. Our results help in understanding
whether perceived choice responsibility is a crucial variable influencing the support of modern
safety nets.
The experiment consists of two treatments. In the Exogenous Risks (EXO) treatment subjects
cannot influence the extent to which they are exposed to risk, while in the Endogenous Risks
(ENDO) treatment subjects can choose their risk exposure. In the first part of the ENDO (EXO)
treatment subjects choose (are assigned) one of two risky lotteries. Both lottery options have the
same expected value but differ in their variance. In the second part of both treatments, subjects
are paired and one subject in each pair is randomly selected to choose a risk sharing level.
1For recent articles see New York Times, 2011, CNN, 2011, Washington Post, 2012.
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Importantly, the risk sharing decision is made ex-ante, that is before the lotteries’ outcomes are
determined. The risk sharing level indicates the percentage amount that will be subtracted from
the eventual outcomes and then equally redistributed in the pair at the end of the experiment.
We implement the strategy method, which means that participants are asked to choose a risk
sharing level both for the case that their partner faces the same risk exposure as themselves,
and for the case that risk exposures differ. In the last part of the experiment we use a series of
incentivized lottery choices to elicit participants’ risk preferences.
Our main result is that when risk exposure is a choice (ENDO) average risk sharing among
low risk taking individuals is higher when their partner is exposed to low risk as compared to high
risk, while no such difference exists when risks are exogenously assigned (EXO). When further
differentiating individuals based on their general risk preferences, we find that the result holds
for risk averse individuals that choose a low risk exposure, and also for risk seeking individuals
that choose a high risk exposure. Our results are important for understanding how responsibility
attributions affect risk sharing in settings where risk exposure is perceived as a choice as opposed
to settings where risk exposure is perceived as uncontrollable. Since in our experiment high and
low risk exposure leads to the same outcome in expectation, our results can be considered a lower
bound for the role of responsibility attributions. Their role may be more significant when the
high risk has a lower expected value than the safer option.
The research in this paper is related to some experimental studies that investigate the support
for ex-post income redistribution in contexts where individuals’ outcomes are the product of risky
decisions. In Cappelen et al. (2013) participants make choices between a risky lottery and a safe
alternative and after observing the eventual outcomes, they are asked how much they want to
redistribute to another randomly matched participant. The authors find that individuals who
avoid risk do not redistribute much in favor of unlucky risk takers, while the willingness to reduce
inequalities is higher between lucky and unlucky risk takers. Thral and Rademacher (2009)
implement the solidarity game of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and compare it to a treatment
where individuals choose between a safe payment and a risky lottery. The authors show that
individuals that choose the safe payment are less willing to reduce inequalities when matched
with individuals that choose the lottery and become needy, as compared to individuals that
become needy by pure chance. To summarize, it seems that risk taking is negatively perceived
by individuals that avoid risk, and thus reduces their willingness to equalize earnings ex-post.
In the cited literature, redistribution decisions are made at a point when risk is resolved
and individuals’ outcomes are thus known. Naturally, however, decisions to endorse a given
redistributive system or policy have consequences that affect future time periods, for which
individuals’ outcomes are yet uncertain. Our experiment allows testing whether responsibility
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for risky choices matters when individuals do not know how risk will eventually materialize.
Importantly, this implies that individuals face uncertainty about whether risk sharing will be
profitable for them or not. Furthermore, unlike in previous experiments, individuals cannot
entirely eliminate their risk exposure but - like in reality - only influence the degree of risk
exposure with their choices.
Our paper is also related to recent studies showing that income inequalities are more ac-
ceptable when they can be traced back to factors within people’s control. Surveys, as well as
experiments, reveal that support for redistribution is higher among people that think that wealth
results from unjust motives, like luck or immoral behavior, as opposed to hard work, effort and
skills (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Fong, 2011, Durante and Put-
terman, 2009, Krawczyk, 2010). It is not a trivial question whether responsibility attributions
play a key role also in a risk sharing context, as it differs substantially from a context in which
individuals decide about how to redistribute income.
Lastly, we contribute to a recent line of research that analyzes insurance choices from a
behavioral perspective (for an overview see Richter et al., 2014). Friedl et al., 2014, for example,
investigate how insurance demand is affected by social comparisons and in particular how it
depends on whether risks are correlated or not. Social comparisons are also the main focus of
Rohde and Rohde (2011) and Linde and Sonnemans (2012) who study how decision making
under risk is affected by observing the payoffs or the risk exposure of others. In contrast to the
cited studies, the choices in our set-up affect both the decision maker’s and the partner’s income.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design. Section 3 summarizes theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Results are presented in
Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the results and conclude.
2 Experimental Design
We implement two treatments, EXO and ENDO, that differ with respect to whether subjects
can choose the extent to which they are exposed to risk. Both treatments consist of three parts.
In the following we describe each part in detail and point out the treatment differences.
2.1 Risk Exposure
In the risk exposure part all subjects in ENDO make a choice between two lottery options,
while in EXO subjects are assigned one of the two lotteries by a random draw operated by
the computer. Subjects face a lottery choice (ENDO) or a lottery assignment (EXO) in four
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situations, that differ in the available lotteries.2 We employ more than one situation in order
to test whether results are robust to different combinations of outcomes and probabilities. In
each of the four situations participants are presented with two lotteries, R (high risk) and r (low
risk).3 Both lotteries yield a high outcome, H, with probability p and a low outcome, l, with
probability 1− p. Our design thus ensures that individuals can share in the up and downside of
others’ outcomes.4 All the employed lotteries have the same expected value of e6, which makes
decision situations easier to compare.5 At the same time, in each situation the variance of lottery
r is lower than that of lottery R: lottery r second order stochastically dominates lottery R, and
it is thus preferred by risk averse individuals.
This design reflects the fact that in reality risky options may entail an upside or a downside
as compared to less risky alternatives. For example, if a smoker’s increased risk of getting lung
cancer materializes, the rest of society finances his medical treatment via health insurance. If,
however, the risk does not materialize, and cigarette consumption is taxed, smokers’ high risk
taking may benefit society.
Table 1 gives an overview of the lotteries employed in the different situations. In each sit-
uation, probabilities and outcomes are selected in a way that participants can easily compare
the two lotteries. In particular, lottery R and r are always equal in one dimension, either with
respect to the outcomes’ probabilities or with respect to the value of the lower outcome of the
lottery, l.
In situations I and II, the riskier option implies either a higher probability of ending up
with a zero outcome or introduces the possibility of a zero outcome, as compared to the safer
alternative. Situations III and IV are less extreme, in the sense that the low outcome of R is
strictly larger than zero. We can thus test to what extent responsibility for risk exposure depends
on the severity of the potential consequences of risk taking.
Situations are presented in random order to the participants. All participants are
informed that only one of the situations will matter for their final earnings. The instructions ex-
plain that each situation is equally likely to be selected for payment at the end of the experiment.
2We also implemented a fifth situation where subjects choose between a safe payment and a risky lottery. The
data referring to this situation are however not informative for our research question and are thus not included in
the analysis of this paper.
3In the experiment a neutral wording is used. Please refer to the online appendix for the instructions used in
the experiment.
4Lotteries with negative outcomes are not implemented as they carry a number of practical implementation
problems, chiefly related to the impossibility of implementing real monetary losses in laboratory experiments.
5In situation II the expected value of r is e5.9. This exception was made to avoid confronting subjects with
lottery outcomes that have more than one decimal point.
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Table 1 Situations in the risk exposure part
situation option p H l
I R 0.2 30 0
r 0.5 12 0
II R 0.6 10 0
r 0.6 6.5 5
III R 0.2 22 2
r 0.2 10 5
IV R 0.2 14 4
r 0.5 8 4
2.2 Risk Sharing
At the beginning of the risk sharing part subjects are randomly matched in pairs and in each
pair one subject is selected at random to choose a risk sharing level s ∈ [0, 100]. The value
of s has to be chosen ex-ante and represents the percentage amount that is deducted from the
lottery outcome of each subject after risk is resolved. In each risk sharing pair, the deducted
amounts are added up and equally re-distributed at the end of the experiment. Higher values
of s imply lower levels of earnings’ inequality, with s = 100 leading to equal outcomes in a pair.
The following expression defines the earnings of a subject i resulting from the first two parts of
the experiment, where Yi is the lottery outcome of i and Yj is the lottery outcome of i’s risk
sharing partner, j. The lottery outcomes of i and j are uncorrelated.
Πi = (1− s
100
) · Yi +
s
100 · (Yi + Yj)
2
(1)
We employ the strategy method to elicit risk sharing levels. That is, for each of the four
situations in the risk exposure part, a subject chooses two values of s. One for the case that
the risk sharing partner faces the same lottery and one for the case that he faces the alternative
lottery. Within a treatment, this allows observation of whether individuals’ risk sharing decisions
are conditioned on the risk exposure of the risk sharing partner.
At the end of the experiment subjects are informed about the lottery chosen by (ENDO) or
assigned to (EXO) their risk sharing partner. Further, the relevant risk sharing level is revealed
to the subject who did not make decisions in the second part. Risk is then resolved, the chosen
redistribution is implemented and earnings are determined. Instructions for the risk exposure
and the risk sharing parts are administered together at the beginning of the experiment. Hence,
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in both treatments subjects know that decisions about risk sharing will have to be made after
the risk exposure part.
2.3 Elicitation of Risk Preferences
This part of the experiment is designed to estimate subjects’ risk preferences. We use the multiple
choice list method (Harrison and Cox, 2008) and elicit participants’ certainty equivalents for the
previously employed lotteries. For each lottery subjects see a screen on the computer that
contains a description of the lottery and a list of 20 equally spaced sure amounts, ranging from
the lottery’s high to its low potential outcome. In each row of the list subjects have to make a
choice between the lottery and the sure amount. To ensure a unique switching point subject are
not allowed to switch back and forth between the two. Certainty equivalents are then calculated
as the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and the consecutive
sure amount in the list.
2.4 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEE-
lab) at Maastricht University. Subjects were recruited online with the system ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). For the computerized implementation we used the experimental software Z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). A typical session lasted approximately 1.5 hours and the average earnings were
18.70 Euro. In total 208 subjects participated in the experiment, 112 in the EXO and 96 in the
ENDO treatment.6 In order to ensure participants’ understanding of the instructions a set of
control questions was administered before the actual start of the experiment. Before being paid
out and released participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire that gathered information on
their socio-economic characteristics.
3 Predictions and hypotheses
Consider a subject i that is asked to choose how much risk he wants to share with subject j. If
subject i is motivated by his own material interest, he will choose a risk sharing level si in order
to maximize the expected utility of his earnings.7 Four states of the world k need to be taken
6A computer problem in one session led all screens to freeze during the stage where subjects were presented
the control questions. As the crash required skipping the complete stage we have no control over whether subjects
understood the experimental design, and therefore discarded the data.
7Theoretical predictions can also be derived under the assumption that subjects’ behavior under risk is best
described by Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The results are largely in line with
those of expected utility theory and are available from the authors upon request.
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into account: both subjects in the pair win, both lose, i wins and j loses, j wins and i loses.
Formally stated:
max
si
EUi =
4∑
k=1
pk · U(Πi,k) (2)
where pk indicates the probability of the state of the world k and U(·) is the utility of i’s
final earnings, Πi,k, in state k (see equation 1). The optimal risk sharing level s
∗
i depends on
the decision maker’s risk preferences, as captured by the shape of U(·), and on the risk exposure
of both individuals in the risk sharing pair. In essence, a risk averse individual has a high
incentive to share risk, as this decreases the variance of the risk he is exposed to. The lower
the risk exposure of his partner, the more attractive it is to share risk. On the other hand, in
our experiment risk sharing can never be optimal for risk seeking individuals when it implies a
reduction in risk exposure.8 Importantly, if subjects are self-interested, we should observe no
significant differences in risk sharing between ENDO and EXO when taking risk exposure and
individual risk preferences into account.
Abundant empirical evidence has demonstrated that, in contrast to the classical assumption
of self-interested agents, a considerable fraction of individuals are characterized by a concern
for others (see, for example, Sobel, 2005 and Camerer, 2003). Moreover, many individuals are
willing to support some degree of redistribution in favor of the less fortunate, even at a personal
cost (see Fong, 2011, and Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012).
Risk sharing in our experiment affects both the decision maker’s and the partner’s outcomes.
In particular, the level of risk sharing determines the expected outcome differences between
sharing partners: the less risk is shared, the higher the expected inequality. In case of complete
risk sharing final outcomes are exactly equal. If we assume that individuals dislike both expected
advantageous and disadvantageous inequalities (see Trautmann, 2009, who formalized the seminal
model by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, for the case of expected outcomes), full risk sharing is optimal,
irrespective of individuals’ risk exposure and of whether risk exposure is voluntary (ENDO) or
not (EXO). This prediction can be intuitively understood when considering that, under full risk
sharing, an individual’s expected utility is 6 Euro, that is the EV of compounding one’s own
lottery with the one of the sharing partner. Instead, when less risk is shared, expected utility is
equal to 6 Euro, the EV of the chosen lottery, minus the disutility generated by the sum of the
expected inequalities, which is always positive. Most notably, the idea that people care about
expected inequalities in outcomes implies that risk sharing in ENDO should not be significantly
different from risk sharing in EXO.
8An elaborate discussion of the theoretical predictions can be found in Appendix A.
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One of the limits of this approach is that it cannot account for individuals’ heterogeneous
risk preferences, as utility is linear in payoffs.9 However, even if we assume that risk sharing
choices are motivated by the desire to reduce both risk exposure and expected inequalities in
outcomes, we would not await any difference in risk sharing behaviour between EXO and ENDO
when controlling for individuals’ risk exposure. This highlights the main limitation of using an
approach that is purely outcome-based: it neglects how distributional preferences are affected
by the way in which incomes are generated.
Several studies demonstrate that inequalities due to factors within individuals’ control, such
as effort, are perceived as largely justifiable, while more redistribution is observed when income
differences are attributable to elements beyond people’s influence, such as pure luck (see Alesina
and Glaeser, 2004, Cappelen et al., 2007, Durante and Putterman, 2009 and Krawczyk, 2010).
Whereas in EXO risk exposure is randomly assigned, participants in the ENDO treatment can
influence their income by choosing their risk exposure. Thus, individuals’ aversion to inequality
may be higher in EXO as compared to ENDO. This leads us to formulate the hypothesis that,
everything else equal, average risk sharing is higher in EXO than in ENDO [Hp1].
Cappelen et al. (2013) find that after risks are resolved, most individuals are not in favor of
redistributing income from individuals who avoid risk to unlucky risk takers. At the same time
most individuals are willing to eliminate ex post outcome differences resulting from differences in
luck among risk-takers. Thral and Rademacher (2009) study how much individuals that choose
a safe option are willing to transfer to individuals that instead choose a risk, and end up with a
low outcome. The authors compare transfers to a situation in which all participants are exposed
to risk, and find that subjects are less generous towards those whose bad outcome is a result
of risk-taking as compared to those who could not choose their risk exposure. This evidence
shows that individuals are less willing to reduce inequalities when they result from avoidable, as
compared to unavoidable, risks. In short, responsibility for risk taking matters for redistribution
decisions.
Building on this finding, we investigate whether responsibility for risk taking likewise affects
risk sharing choices. In our set-up risk sharing is decided before lottery outcomes are known
and hence, unlike the previously mentioned studies, it is ex-ante not clear how redistribution
will take place. However, risk exposure determines who is more likely to be in need, or will
receive more help in case the low outcome materializes. Indeed, compared to its alternative, the
riskier lottery entails either an increased likelihood of the bad state or a lower outcome in the
bad state. We thus hypothesize that, compared to EXO, in ENDO low risk takers are relatively
9It would surely be worthwhile to model risk sharing decisions as depending on both risk and social preferences,
but such a model is beyond the scope of this paper.
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less supportive of redistribution with high risk takers than with low risk takers [Hp2]. To test
this hypothesis, we analyze whether in ENDO individuals condition risk sharing decisions on
their partner’s risk exposure to a different extent as compared to EXO, after controlling for
individuals’ selfish incentives to share risk. As we apply the strategy method, we can observe
risk sharing decisions both for the case where the partner’s risk exposure is high and low.
4 Results
We start our analysis by comparing average risk sharing between treatments and proceed by
investigating risk sharing within treatments. In particular, we investigate how an individual’s
decision to share risk depends on his risk exposure and risk preferences, and on the risk exposure
of the sharing partner. Before we present the results on risk sharing, we estimate participants’
risk preferences using the elicited certainty equivalents from the third part of the experiment.
4.1 Elicited risk preferences
For the elicitation of participants’ risk preferences we assume a power utility function for money
U(x) = xα and estimate the parameter value of α ∈]0,∞[ at the individual level, by minimizing
the sum of squared distances (see Wakker, 2008 and Wakker, 2010). That is:
min
α
∑
n
[(pnH
α
n + (1− pn)lαn)
1
α − cen]2
where the first term in brackets indicates the theoretically predicted certainty equivalent
for lottery n, and cen is the elicited certainty equivalent of lottery n = 1, ..9. To correct for
heteroscedasticity lotteries are normalized to uniform length. In the remainder we focus on the
results regarding subjects that in the second part of the experiment are selected to choose the risk
sharing levels. We find that the median participant is characterized by α = 0.89 (s.d. α = 0.41,
mean α = 0.93). A majority of 67% of participants are risk averse.
Since options are randomly assigned in the EXO treatment, we observe no correlation between
subjects’ estimated risk preferences and the type of lotteries assigned to them (Spearman’s rho=-
0.06, p-value=0.67). In other words, in many cases an individual is exposed to a risk that is
not in line with his risk preferences. On the other hand, in ENDO the estimated coefficient
of risk aversion α is positively correlated with the number of times an individual chooses the
riskier option in the risk exposure part (Spearman’s rho=0.42, p-value< 0.01). This implies that
the more an individual is risk seeking (averse) the more often he selects the riskier (less risky)
lottery in the risk exposure part. Table 2 indicates, for each situation, the percentage of risk
averse and risk seeking individuals that in the risk exposure part choose a lottery in line with
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their estimated risk preferences. From now on, we refer to those cases as ‘consistent’, and as
‘inconsistent’ otherwise.
Table 2 Risk preferences and risk exposure, ENDO
Situation Choose r and α < 1 Choose R and α > 1
I 67% 50%
II 70% 39%
III 57% 72%
IV 60% 67%
In a majority of cases subjects choose a risk exposure in line with their estimated risk prefer-
ences, the occurrence of consistent behavior being especially high among risk averse individuals.
In the following analysis we present our results on risk sharing. In order to compare risk
sharing between treatments, we need to account for the fact that in EXO individuals may be
exposed to a risk that they would not have chosen voluntarily. We thus use individuals’ estimated
risk preferences as an indication of whether individuals’ risk exposure in EXO is in line with their
general risk preferences. In the ENDO treatment elicited risk preferences are a good predictor
of risk exposure choices: thus, we first conduct the analysis of risk sharing behavior taking only
individuals’ chosen risk exposure into account. Successively, we also distinguish individuals based
on whether their chosen risk exposure is in line with their estimated risk preferences.
4.2 Risk sharing
When averaging over all situations, we find that risk sharing is equal to 56% in EXO and lower
in ENDO, with 51%. The histograms in Figure 3 in the Appendix display all risk sharing
choices in EXO and ENDO. In order to test whether risk sharing is statistically significant
between treatments [Hp1], we run an OLS regression with risk sharing as the dependent variable,
controlling for the risk exposure of both sharing partners and the decision maker’s estimated risk
preferences. We find that the coefficient of the treatment dummy is insignificant, and thus
conclude that there are no significant differences in risk sharing levels between the ENDO and
EXO treatment. All regression results are reported in the Appendix.
Result 1. Average risk sharing is not significantly different when risk exposure is random as
compared to when it is an individual choice.
In order to test our second hypothesis [Hp2], in the remainder we focus on the relation
between risk sharing decisions and risk preferences. Since we employ the strategy method, we
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can apply a within-subject analysis. We compare individuals’ risk sharing behavior when their
sharing partner faces option r to the case where their partner faces the riskier option R.
We start by distinguishing individuals based on their risk exposure only and first look at
those that were assigned (EXO) or chose (ENDO) the safer lottery r. Figure 1 shows average
risk sharing in all situations separately for both treatments. The dark bars display average
risk sharing levels in cases where both individuals i and j face option r, whereas the light bars
represent average risk sharing when the sharing partner, j, faces option R instead.
Averaging over all low risk situations per individual, we find that in the EXO treatment risk
sharing is on average 55% when the partner’s option is r and 57% if it is R. A two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, henceforth WS, shows that these risk sharing levels are not significantly different
(p-value=0.60). A WS test conducted for each situation separately confirms that when risks are
exogenous, the partner’s risk exposure is not related to risk sharing in a statistically significant
way (WS test p-value≥ 0.51). Results remain insignificant even when we only consider those
subjects characterized by risk averse preferences, as measured by α (WS test p-value≥ 0.24). This
is important because it shows that results for EXO are not driven by the presence of individuals
who are exposed to a risk that they would likely not have chosen by themselves.
Fig. 1 Average risk sharing of subjects facing option r (%)
a) EXO b) ENDO
Results are fairly different in the ENDO treatment. The average risk sharing level is 54%
when the sharing partner chooses lottery r and only 45.5% in case the partner opts for lottery
R. This difference is highly significantly different (WS test p-value=0.01). A systematic trend
in behavior in all situations can be observed. Among individuals who choose r, less risk is
shared on average when the partner chooses option R as compared to option r. The difference
is statistically significant in situations I and II, in which high risk taking includes the possibility
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of a zero outcome (WS test p-values≤ 0.08). Results are not significant in situations III and IV
(WS test p-values≥ 0.49). We conclude that only when risk exposure is deliberate, individuals
systematically condition their risk sharing behavior on their partner’s risk exposure. The special
role of a zero outcome for risky decisions has previously been acknowledged. Our results can be
interpreted in line with Ert and Erev (2013) who find evidence for ‘zero avoidance’ behavior in
risk taking in the domain of positive outcome lotteries. Likewise, low risk individuals here may
avoid sharing the risk with individuals that are exposed to the risk of contributing nothing to
the sharing pool, thereby letting the partner bear more responsibility in case the threatening
zero outcome occurs.
Result 2. Individuals who choose to expose themselves to a low risk share on average less risk
with a high risk taker as compared to someone who also makes a cautious choice. This difference
is statistically significant when high risk taking includes the possibility of a zero outcome. When
risk exposure is randomly assigned, average risk sharing does not depend on the partner’s risk
exposure.
We now conduct the same type of analysis for individuals that are assigned (EXO) or choose
(ENDO) the riskier option R. We find that in both treatments and in all decision situations,
average risk sharing does not depend on the risk exposure of the partner (WS test p-value≥
0.25).10 Average risk sharing in EXO is 52% when the partner is assigned r and 57% when the
partner’s option is R. The according values are 50% and 52% in the ENDO treatment.
Result 3. Individuals that are exposed to a high risk do not systematically condition their risk
sharing on their partners risk exposure, regardless of whether the risk is endogenous or random.
As anticipated in the previous section, our analysis proceeds by separating the cases where
subjects choose (are assigned) a risk exposure in line with their estimated risk preferences from
those where this is not the case. This is especially interesting in order to understand risk sharing
decisions in the ENDO treatment, as we find that subjects’ behavior is systematically related to
the consistency of the chosen risk exposure with the estimated risk preferences. This approach
confirms that, on average, in the EXO treatment risk sharing decisions do not depend on the
partner’s risk exposure. Indeed, we do not observe any statistically significant differences at
the aggregate level (WS test p-value≥ 0.37) and no systematic trend at the situation specific
level when we control for whether individuals face an option consistent with their estimated
risk preferences. We only find a marginally significant difference (10% level) in situation IV,
where risk seeking subjects who are assigned the safer lottery share more risk with a high risk
10Figure 4 in the Appendix shows average risk sharing levels in both treatments.
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partner. In all other cases, differences are statistically insignificant (WS test p-value≥ 0.11). In
the following we exclusively focus our attention on the analysis of risk sharing behavior when
risks are endogenously chosen.
We first consider the cases where participants choose an option consistent with their estimated
risk preferences. The importance of analyzing risk sharing behavior when choices are consistent is
evident if considering that such choices are simply most frequent, as shown in Table 2. Further,
many individuals display the same attitude towards risk across different domains (see Einav
et al., 2012 and Dohmen et al., 2011) and hence, the following results are perhaps our most
generalizable ones.
Among risk averse individuals that choose the low risk option r, the average risk sharing level
is 58% when the sharing partner also chooses option r, but 12 percentage points lower when the
partner chooses option R (WS test p-value= 0.01).11 Figure 2 a) shows the average risk sharing
levels in each decision situation.12
In line with the results of the previous section, we find the same pattern of behavior in
situations I to IV: i’s willingness to share risk with j is lower when j chooses the riskier lottery,
R. This difference is statistically significant in situations I and II (WS test p-value= 0.08 and
0.04, respectively). In situations III and IV differences are insignificant (WS test p-value≥ 0.40).
We now consider risk seeking participants that act consistently, and thus choose R. The
average sharing level is 41% in case the sharing partner also chooses option R. In contrast, in case
the sharing partner chooses option r, the average sharing level is 50% (WS test p-value= 0.20).
Figure 2 b) shows that when risk seeking subjects act consistently, they systematically share
more risks with subjects who choose the safe option. Differences are statistically significant at
the 5% level in situation II. In the other situations, most likely because of the limited number of
observations, differences are insignificant (WS test p-value≥ 0.36). In sum, risk sharing behavior
of consistent risk seeking participants displays the same tendency as in cases where risk averse
individuals choose consistently: facing a high risk taker as a sharing partner reduces people’s
willingness to share risks.
Result 4. When risk exposure is endogenous and individuals choose their risk exposure in a
consistent way, they tend to share more risk on average with a partner that made a cautious
choice as compared to a risky one.
In the last part of the analysis we turn our attention to the cases where individuals in the
11Our unit of observation is an individual’s average risk sharing level calculated over those situations where the
individual chose an option in line with his estimated risk preferences.
12An overview of all average risk sharing levels aggregated over the four decision situations can be seen in Table 4
in the Appendix.
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Fig. 2 Average risk sharing in ENDO taking consistency into account (%)
a) Consistent risk averse b) Consistent risk seeking
c) Inconsistent risk averse d) Inconsistent risk seeking
ENDO treatment choose an option that is not in line with their estimated risk preferences.
We will not try to provide an explanation of the observed inconsistencies, but rather focus
on understanding risk sharing behavior in these cases. We begin by considering risk averse
individuals who select option R. Risk sharing is on average 59% when their sharing partner also
chooses option R. On the other hand, when the other member chooses option r, the average
sharing level is 50%. Hence, in contrast to what is observed when risk averse individuals act
consistently, they share less risk if their partner chooses option r (WS test p-value=0.15). Figure 2
c) shows the average sharing levels per situation. Note that in all situations i shares on average
less risk when j chooses the safer option r as compared to when he chooses R. This difference is
statistically significant in situation I and IV (WS test p-value=0.08 and 0.09 respectively). In the
other situations differences are statistically insignificant (WS test p-value≥ 0.85). We conclude
that in case generally cautious individuals select the riskier option they prefer to share more risk
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with individuals who make the same risky choice.
Result 5. Risk averse individuals that decide to expose themselves to a high risk tend to share
less risk with a cautious sharing partner as compared to a high risk taker.
Lastly, we note that the behavior of risk seeking individuals that choose inconsistently does
not present any systematic trend. The average sharing level is 46% when the sharing partner
also chose option r and 44% when he chose option R (WS test p-value=0.75). There are no
significant differences within situations (WS test p-value≥ 0.59), as suggested by Figure 2 d).
To summarize, we find a lower willingness to share risk with high risk takers whenever in-
dividuals choose a risk exposure in line with their estimated risk preferences. However, when
individuals deviate from their general risk preferences, average risk sharing either does not de-
pend on the partner’s risk exposure or individuals share more with high risk takers. Importantly,
we find that none of the described systematic differences emerges in the EXO treatment, that
is when risk exposure is beyond individuals’ control. Our results thus allow us to conclude that
responsibility for risk exposure matters for individuals’ risk sharing decisions.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this study we experimentally investigate how individuals’ support for risk sharing is related to
whether risk exposure is deliberate or unswayable, and how it is related to individuals’ own risk
preferences and to the risk exposure of the sharing partner. The novelty of our experiment is that
individuals make risk sharing decisions before they know their own and others’ income positions.
This feature is not only typical of insurance decisions, but of any context where redistribution
policies that affect future periods are decided on. Our design captures the essential features of
risk sharing arrangements: individuals are heterogeneous in their exposure to risk, and those
exposed to a higher risk are either more likely to benefit from the redistribution inherent to risk
sharing, or their benefits from redistribution in case they are unlucky are higher as compared
to those of low risk takers. Our design further takes into account that high risk taking may be
beneficial to the sharing group if the high risk does not materialize in a bad way. This is the
case, for example, when the consumption of high risk related products, such as cigarettes or junk
food, is taxed. Further, like in the field, in our setting risk exposure can only be reduced and
not completely eliminated.
We find that when risks are exogenously assigned, controlling for the decision maker’s risk
exposure and risk preferences, average risk sharing does not systematically vary with the risk
exposure of the risk sharing partner. Risk sharing behavior is fairly different, however, when
individuals can choose their risk exposure. Our main finding is that individuals who avoid high
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risks are less willing to share risk with high risk takers as compared to low risk takers. Mitigating
expected inequalities and optimizing one’s risk exposure may constitute a trade-off for individuals
who choose to expose themselves to a low risk. A self-interested risk averse individual would
share less risk with someone who is highly exposed to risk as compared to someone whose risk
exposure is low. However, unless risk is fully shared, expected inequalities are higher when the
risk sharing partner is exposed to high, as compared to low, risk.
Our results suggest that the trade-off between selfish motives and equality is resolved more
in favor of the former in ENDO as compared to EXO. Differently stated, the fact that cautious
individuals in ENDO, but not in EXO, share relatively less risk with high risk takers as compared
to low risk takers suggests that individuals are more willing to accept inequalities when high risk
taking is voluntary. The fact that only in ENDO high risk takers tend to share more risk
with partners that choose the safer lottery also suggests that, when risk exposure is voluntary,
individuals give relatively more weight to inequality reduction with cautious partners. In other
words, individuals are less willing to share their fate with someone who willingly chose to expose
himself to a high risk. We conclude that responsibility attributions for risk taking systematically
affect individuals’ risk sharing behavior. In particular, choosing an avoidable high risk exposure
translates into increased responsibility for one’s fate, even though outcomes are not yet known
when the risk sharing decision is made.
An alternative interpretation of our results is that risk sharing decisions are motivated by
an altruistic act of respect towards the risk preferences of the risk sharing partner. When risk
exposure is endogenous, individuals may infer their partner’s risk preferences from his lottery
choice. For example, a risk averse individual may judge a partner that opts for the high risk lot-
tery as risk seeking, and thus share less risk with him. When risk exposure is instead exogenous,
drawing inferences about risk preferences is not possible, and hence individuals do not condition
risk sharing on their partner’s risk exposure. Our data do not allow us to entirely dismiss this
interpretation of the results. However, the existing literature on ex-post redistribution decisions
cited in Section 3 clearly lends support to an interpretation based on the role of responsibility
for risk taking.
An interesting pattern pertains to the less common situations where individuals who are
generally cautious choose a high risk. The fact that these individuals tend to share more with
partners that made the same risky choice suggests that when they ‘dare’ to take risks they can
better identify with other high risk takers. This identification effect may keep individuals from
lowering risk sharing and, in contrast, induce them to even share more risk with the partner
they identify with. This interpretation is suggested by studies showing a positive relationship
between social identification and willingness to redistribute income (see Klor and Shayo, 2010,
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and Fowler and Kam, 2007). Further investigations are however needed to test the robustness
of this effect.
To conclude, our results do not only confirm that social comparisons of income matter in
decision contexts characterized by risk, they also suggest that the way in which risk is per-
ceived influences how much risk sharing decisions incorporate social concerns. It remains an
open question, under which circumstances some preferences and behaviors are perceived as more
exogenous, and thus less deserving of condemnation than others (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996).
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A Theoretical predictions
In order to make quantitative predictions on allocations, we assume that subjects are charac-
terized by a CRRA utility function for money, that is U(x) = xα. A risk neutral individual is
characterized by α = 1, a risk averse individual by 0 < α < 1 and a risk loving individual by
α > 1.
Recall that in the first part of the EXO treatment each subject is randomly assigned either
option r or the riskier option R: hence, in a pair of subjects four combinations of lotteries are
possible. Furthermore, the optimal risk sharing level s∗ depends on whether a subject is risk
averse or risk seeking.13 Hence, eight possible cases need to be considered: Table 3 summarizes
the predicted optimal sharing levels for all cases in situations I, III and IV.
Table 3 Optimal sharing level s∗ of i.
i is risk averse i is risk seeking
i’s option r r R R R R r r
j’s option r R R r R r R r
s∗ of i 100 [7, 48] 100 100 0 0 100 0
Columns three and four of Table 3 show that for a risk averse subject i full risk sharing is
optimal if assigned a risky option, irrespective of the option assigned to the other subject in the
pair, j. This is because the benefits of reducing risk exposure predominate even if j faces the
riskier option R. If i is assigned option r, the optimal sharing level is 100% if j was also assigned
option r. On the other hand, if j is assigned option R, the optimal sharing levels depend on
the situation and are within the range of 7 − 48%. In this case the optimal sharing level for i
results from a trade off between reducing risk exposure and facing j’s riskier option R.14 For a
risk seeking subject i it is only beneficial to share risk if j faces a riskier option than he does.
The optimal risk sharing level in that case is 100%.15
Optimal risk sharing levels are unchanged in the ENDO treatment. Expected Utility Theory
predicts that in the risk exposure part subjects choose an option consistent with their own risk
13When subject i is risk neutral, there is no uniquely defined s∗ if the lotteries are characterized by the same
expected value. In such a case EUi is indeed constant and independent of s.
14Some exceptions apply to situation II due to the small expected value difference between lotteries. Optimal
risk sharing is higher than 48% for slightly risk averse individuals that face r and whose partner faces R. Further,
for those individuals optimal risk sharing is lower than 100% when their lottery is R and their partner’s lottery is
r.
15In situation I for α < 1.17 zero risk sharing is also a solution.
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preferences, i.e. a risk averse (seeking) individual should choose option r (R). This is also true
when considering that choices in the first part of the experiment can be strategically motivated.
That is, subjects have no incentives to choose an option that is not in line with their own risk
preferences even when they account for the existence of a successive risk sharing phase.
To summarize, for a given combination of risk preferences and risk exposure, expected utility
theory predicts that risk sharing behavior is identical in the ENDO and the EXO treatment.
B Regression results and additional graphs
Fig. 3 Histogram of risk sharing choices (%)
a) EXO b) ENDO
In both treatments the most common risk sharing choice is 50%. Further, the frequency
of full risk sharing, 100%, is considerable in both treatments, with approximately 15% of the
individuals choosing it.
Table 4 Aggregate average risk sharing (%)
Risk exposure ENDO EXO
Own Partner consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent
r r 58% 46% 55% 57%
r R 46% 44% 56% 62%
R R 41% 59% 55% 58%
R r 50% 50% 51% 53%
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Table 5 Risk sharing level, treatment comparison.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
ENDO -4.753 (3.752)
i-r, j-R -3.638 (2.331)
i-r, j-R -1.139 (3.396)
i-R, j-r -2.018 (2.843)
alpha 1.758 (3.910)
Intercept 55.860∗∗∗ (4.402)
N 832
R2 0.009
F (5,103) .969
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are
clustered around subjects; the case i-r, j-r is the omitted treat-
ment category; ENDO is a treatment dummy.
Fig. 4 Average risk sharing of subjects facing option R (%)
a) EXO b) ENDO
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